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Post-legislative	scrutiny:	what	recommendations	are
committees	making,	and	are	they	being	accepted?
There	is	much	we	don’t	know	about	post-legislative	scrutiny,	one	being	the	strength	of
recommendations	made	and	the	acceptance	of	those	by	the	government.	Thomas	Caygill
explains	that	committees	are	mostly	producing	recommendations	which	are	calling	for	small	and
lower	medium	action,	possibly	because	weaker	recommendations	are	more	likely	to	be
implemented.
Once	legislation	has	entered	the	statute	book,	there	are	some	who	assume	that	is	the	end	of	the	matter	and	the
end	of	Parliament’s	role.	However	the	House	of	Lords	Constitution	Committee	stated	that	Parliament’s
responsibility	for	legislation	should	not	end	once	a	bill	has	become	an	Act.	This	is	where	post-legislative	scrutiny
comes	in.	It	is	defined	by	the	Law	Commission	as	a	‘broad	form	of	review,	which	addresses	the	effects	of
legislation	in	terms	of	whether	intended	policy	objectives	have	been	met,	and	if	so,	how	effectively’.
In	the	last	decade	a	more	systematic	approach	to	post-legislative	scrutiny	has	been	taken	by	both	government
and	Parliament,	with	the	House	of	Lords	Liaison	Committee	in	2012	promising	to	appoint	at	least	one	ad	hoc
committee	per	session,	while	since	2008	government	departments	have	been	required	to	prepare	and	publish
memoranda,	assessing	whether	an	Act	has	met	its	key	objectives,	within	three	to	five	years	of	it	entering	the
statue	book.	These	memoranda	are	then	presented	to	departmental	select	committees	for	additional	scrutiny.
However,	while	we	know	what	post-legislative	scrutiny	is	and	that	it	is	undertaken	by	committees	in	both	Houses
of	Parliament,	there	is	a	lot	we	do	not	know.	Here,	and	drawing	on	my	PhD	research,	I	will	focus	upon	what
recommendations	committees	are	making	following	post-legislative	inquiries	and	whether	the	government	is
accepting	them.
There	are	three	areas	which	this	article	will	cover:	the	strength	of	recommendations,	the	acceptance	of	those
recommendations	by	the	government,	and	the	acceptance	of	recommendations	by	their	strength.	These	three
areas	are	important	as	we	currently	do	not	know	what	the	output	of	post-legislative	scrutiny	has	been	despite	it
being	a	core	task	of	departmental	select	committees	in	the	Commons.
In	terms	of	the	strength	of	recommendations	that	committees	are	producing,	the	research	has	shown	the
following	breakdown;
No	Action	–	3%
Small	Action	(e.g.	information	to	be	released)	–	40%
Medium	A	Action	(e.g.	additional	resources)	–	20%
Medium	B	Action	(e.g.	new	regulations)	–	29%
Medium	C	Action	(e.g.	substantial	amendments	to	an	Act)	–	9%
Large	Action	(e.g.	new	legislation)	–	>0.5%
This	data	has	been	collated	from	the	recommendations	contained	in	seventeen	post-legislative	scrutiny	reports
between	2005	and	2016	and	shows	that	43%	of	recommendations	called	for	no	or	small	action	on	behalf	of	the
government.	Recommendations	which	called	for	some	kind	of	medium	action	on	behalf	of	the	government
totalled	58%	and	there	were	only	two	recommendations	out	of	417	that	were	classified	as	calling	for	a	large
action.
The	data	suggests	that	committees	tend	to	focus	their	recommendations	on	ones	calling	for	small	and	lower
medium	actions	–	accounting	for	nearly	two-thirds	of	recommendations	(no,	small,	and	medium	A	combined).
This	could	be	a	response	to	knowing	they	do	not	have	the	power	to	force	the	government	to	accept	and
implement	their	recommendations.	As	a	result	committees	may	wish	to	hedge	their	bets	and	recommend	small
and	medium	actions	which	are	more	likely	to	be	accepted	by	the	government.	This	strategy	has	been
acknowledged	by	both	Meghan	Benton	and	Meg	Russell	and	also	by	Malcolm	Aldons.	Although	my	research
interviews	suggest	that	weaker	recommendations	could	be	made	for	one	of	the	following	three	reasons;
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Internal	political	compromise:	committees	know	that	a	unanimous	report	is	more	influential,	and	try	to
achieve	consensus.	That	sometimes	means	that	they	prefer	a	weaker	recommendation	on	which	they	can
all	agree,	rather	than	a	stronger	one	which	would	cause	a	division.
Seeking	compromise	with	the	Government	–	committees	recognise	that	they	won’t	get	everything	they
want.	They	sometimes	judge	that	it	would	be	better	to	get	something	(to	address	whatever	problem	they
have	identified)	than	nothing.
Lack	of	evidence.	Sometimes	committees	just	don’t	have	the	evidence	to	make	a	strong	recommendation.
There	are	some	recommendations	that	would	count	as	weak,	because	they	ask	for	reviews	or	consideration
rather	than	action.	But	that	could	at	least	in	part	due	to	not	having	the	evidence	base	to	support	a	strong
recommendation.
However	in	my	research,	when	asking	committee	staff	how	much	attention	they	pay	to	the	government’s	likely
response	to	a	recommendation	before	making	it,	they	noted	that	at	times	they	do	pay	some	attention	to	this
factor,	but	it	does	vary	from	issue	to	issue	and	from	committee	to	committee.	One	additional	factor	worth	noting	is
that	the	Acts	scrutinised	so	far	have	in	fact	been	found	to	be	operating	fairly	well,	and	as	such	improved	operation
could	be	achieved	with	relatively	minor	tweaks.
With	regards	to	the	acceptance	of	recommendations,	the	research	showed	the	following	breakdown;
No	Response	–	12%
Rejected	(in	part	and	in	full)	–	36%
Neither	accepted	nor	rejected	–	13%
Accepted	(in	part	and	in	full)	–	39%
This	data	has	been	collated	from	the	government	responses	to	the	seventeen	post-legislative	scrutiny	reports
between	2005	and	2016.	There	is	somewhat	of	a	balance	here	between	recommendations	being	accepted	and
recommendations	being	rejected.	With	39%	of	recommendations	being	accepted	it	might	suggest	that
committees	are	having	an	impact,	however	it	is	not	an	ideal	way	of	measuring	impact	on	the	basis	that	just
because	the	government	states	that	it	accepts	a	recommendation	doesn’t	guarantee	that	it	will	be	implemented.
Finally,	having	noted	that	there	is	potentially	a	strategy	deployed	by	committees	in	terms	of	producing	weaker
recommendations	so	the	government	is	more	likely	to	accept	them,	it	is	important	to	assess	whether	the
government	is	in	fact	rejecting	stronger	recommendations.	The	table	below	confirms	such	a	trend,	in	that	as
recommendations	get	stronger	they	are	more	likely	to	get	rejected	and	in	turn	the	weaker	they	are	the	more	likely
they	are	to	get	accepted.
While	this	does	not	prove	that	such	a	strategy	is	deployed	by	committees	and	there	are	indeed	other	reasons	for
why	committees	may	produce	weaker	recommendations,	the	data	might	provide	a	reason	for	why	committees
may	wish	to	deploy	such	a	strategy.	Indeed,	the	regression	analysis	undertaken	during	the	broader	research
found	that	strength	of	recommendation	was	highly	significant	in	the	acceptance	of	recommendations,	with	weaker
recommendations	being	more	likely	to	be	accepted.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Post-legislative scrutiny: what recommendations are committees making, and are they being accepted? Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-06
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/post-legislative-scrutiny-strength-of-recommendations/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
Coming	back	to	the	original	question,	it	is	clear	that	committees	are,	for	the	most	part,	producing
recommendations	which	are	calling	for	small	and	lower	medium	action.	It	was	noted	that	there	is	potentially	a
strategy	at	play	here	by	committees,	to	produce	weaker	recommendations	as	they	are	more	likely	to	be	accepted.
However	there	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	why	committees	might	produce	weaker	recommendations.	The	data
has	also	shown	that	the	government	is	accepting	39%	of	recommendations	(which	is	not	surprising	as	the
majority	of	recommendations	call	for	no,	small	or	lower	medium	action)	and	appears	to	be	accepting
recommendations	based	on	their	strength.	Although	we	cannot	categorically	say	that	a	strategy	exists,	the	data	in
the	table	might	provide	a	reason	for	why	committees	may	wish	to	deploy	such	a	strategy.
______
About	the	Author
Thomas	Caygill	is	a	PhD	researcher	at	Newcastle	University.
	
	
	
Featured	image	credit:	Stevebidmead,	Pixabay/Public	Domain
	
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Post-legislative scrutiny: what recommendations are committees making, and are they being accepted? Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-06
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/post-legislative-scrutiny-strength-of-recommendations/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
